Abstract: Business incubators have been developed as a key component of entrepreneurial activities in countries all over Europe. These incubators have a non-profit or a for-profit profile, with one-third located in Germany. The increased engagement of private business in what was a public-dominated incubation landscape may influence established theoretical frameworks. Within this context, this paper analyses 11 German business incubators to look at the most common types of for-profit business incubators in Germany and their main characteristics. Moreover, it introduces classification criteria for these incubators. Another aspect of the analysis is the effect of the triple helix dimensions of the different incubation types. The results show that two additional types of incubators can be identified in addition to the traditional public business incubator model, namely 'company builders' and 'accelerators'. Implications for research and practice, as well as directions for future research, are also discussed.
Introduction
Two trends have affected the incubator landscape in recent years: first, an industrial change triggered by digitisation has led to a redesign of business models. Second, numerous successful exits have resulted in a significant number of young millionaires engaged in a combined role as angel investors and serial entrepreneurs, investing their money and operational know-how in new start-ups. Both trends have led to a shift in the established start-up support structures.
Traditionally, the start-up support landscape was dominated by public initiatives' incubator organisations stimulating founding activities. These non-profit incubators (NPIs) were financed with state resources, focused on fulfilling the public mission, and measured with non-commercial criteria in terms of success. But the changes in the landscape have given rise to a new type of business incubator that is more focused on economic success -for-profit incubators (FPIs). However, while popular magazines have noted the rise of FPIs, they are still unnoticed from a research perspective despite their substantial impact.
The impact of shifts in the incubator landscape is remarkable in Germany and Europe as a whole, with one-third located in Germany (Al-Mubaraki and Busler, 2010) . There, public incubators such as technology and business parks dominate; their number is significantly smaller in other European countries. For both Germany and Europe as a whole, private business engagement is growing. These developments have resulted in changes to current underlying frameworks -e.g., the triple helix model -which means that the importance of the private sector is increasing.
Due to the large number of business incubators, there is a thin line between NPIs and other forms of incubators, such as business, innovation, and technology centres, research and science parks, FPIs, and active (seed) venture capitalists or strategic investors (Schwartz, 2012; Dee et al., 2011; Gerlach and Brem, 2015) . This leads to conceptual confusion -especially in Germany, where, as previously mentioned, about one-third of all European incubators are situated (Al-Mubaraki and Busler, 2010) . In 2009, the majority of the approximately 400 German business incubators were linked to universities and research and development institutes (Hofer et al., 2013; Acatech, 2012) . Even though these non-profit, policy-driven business incubators received a lot of attention among researchers (Schwartz, 2012; Schwartz and Hornych, 2010; Glaser, 2005; Seeger, 1997) , research on FPIs in Germany is scarce.
Since the establishment of the first FPIs in Germany in the late '90s, the FPI industry in Germany has grown into an inscrutable market with a high volume of newly founded and failing companies (Achleitner and Engel, 2001; Röttger, 2013) . In particular, the past three years have been referred to as a 'flood of incubators' or an 'accelerator glut' by some newspapers (Finette, 2013; Wirminghaus, 2013) with the majority concentrated in big cities such as Berlin, Cologne, Hamburg and Munich (Fuhrmans, 2012; Müller, 2012) . Most FPIs in Germany support start-ups with a digital or internet-related business model. They are often initiated by successful founders as private or 'stand-alone' incubators or by big corporations as corporate incubators or acceleration programmes (Wohlert, 2013; Räth, 2013a; Wirminghaus, 2013) . Even though there are similarities among FPIs, they vary considerably in terms of quality standards, offerings, operational and financial models, resources, internal processes, exit strategies, supported start-ups, and served markets; they also vary substantially in terminology (Kollmann, 2011; Kaczmarek, 2012; Räth, 2013b Räth, , 2013c Winter, 2012; Hofmann, 2013; Janssen, 2012; Wiesmann, 2012) . Since information about FPIs -and in particular about accelerators and company builders -is limited, there is a need to analyse several forms of FPIs to create a common understanding for the market. Therefore, this paper looks at the following research question: which criteria can be used to characterise the main types of FPIs? For this analysis, the authors use the case of Germany, as this is the key market for incubators in Europe (Al-Mubaraki and Busler, 2010) .
Following other foreign authors (Todorovic and Moenter, 2010; von Zedtwitz and Grimaldi, 2006) , this paper aims to create a better understanding of the present situation of FPIs in Germany. The research question tries to combine practical implications (particularly for German founders and other stakeholders) and to contribute to implications in scientific literature.
This paper analyses different concepts of FPIs in Germany, with a focus on company builders, by developing criteria for classification. To do this, a detailed overview is given of related literature on business incubation. Within this context, this paper comprises eleven German business incubators to assess the most common types of FPIs in Germany. For the analysis of the business incubators, it introduces classification criteria and provides implications for research and practice, as well as directions for future research.
Theoretical foundation and literature on business incubation
In accordance with their rising importance in the business world, research on business incubators has increased remarkably over the last decades (Hackett and Dilts, 2004) , mainly driven by the 1984 founded National Business Incubation Association and conducted in the USA (Dee et al., 2011) . In Europe, studies on business incubation have been done primarily in the UK, followed by Germany and Italy. In this section essential terms are defined and a brief overview of the academic literature on incubators in the modern era is provided. Academic articles trace the transition of incubators from public institutions into the private sector.
The concept of business incubation
The first business incubator was established in Batavia, New York, in 1959 with the aim of fostering regional development and creating jobs in an economically depressed area (Dee et al., 2011; . The National Business Incubation Association estimates that in 2006 there were about 7,000 incubators operating worldwide (Lewis et al., 2011) . Not only do these incubators' range of activities and mode of service delivery differ greatly, but their financial models and the types of businesses they support vary significantly as well (Abduh et al., 2007; Al-Mubaraki and Busler, 2012; Chandra and Fealey, 2009; O'Neal, 2005) . But despite their diverse characteristics, business incubators share a common goal: "to increase the chances of an [incubatee] firm surviving its formative years" [Allen and Rahman, (1985) , p.13] or "to produce successful firms that will leave the program financially and viable and freestanding" 1 . For this, guidelines try to foster the successful implementation of such new business incubators (e.g., Gerlach and Brem, 2015) .
Since then, various typologies of business incubators with different objectives, internal processes, and business models have been established all over the world (Aernoudt, 2004; Nelton, 1984) . Although many studies have focused on finding a uniform definition, consistently using several incubation concepts, and classifying them into typologies, the variety of terms and conceptual confusion in literature is still remarkably high (Hackett and Dilts, 2004; Bøllingtoft and Ulhøi, 2005) . In general, a business incubator can be defined as a 'multi-tenant building … with shared office services' [Allen and McCluskey, (1990), p.62] , "that seeks to provide its incubatees (i.e., 'portfolio-' or 'client-' or 'tenant-companies') with a strategic, value-adding intervention system of monitoring and business assistance" [Hackett and Dilts, (2004), p.57] . Source: Adapted from Schwartz (2012) Following this definition, the value-adding intervention system ( Figure 1 ) defines a starting point to characterise business incubators and to differentiate different types. The system might consist of tangible services such as infrastructure, basic office equipment, and rental or production space, as well as intangible services such as technical support, investors or experts, consulting, and business assistance. (Schwartz, 2012; Bøllingtoft and Ulhøi, 2005; Welch, 2012) . Tangible services can be recognised as the fundamental baseline whereby the intangibles are growth driving factors. Especially the increase of credibility has to be highlighted as a special factor that differentiates not only NPI from FPI, but moreover FPI with a brand name (e.g., YCombinator) from no-names. The proportion of the elements can be differing from incubator to incubator. However, in most cases the incubator's services are only provided until the incubatee graduates (Milanović et al., 2010; Schwartz, 2011) .
Classification of business incubators
The objective of the literature review was to find dimensions to classify business incubators. Nearly all of these dimensions are research objects in individual scientific papers. Therefore, the authors only mention it shortly and focus on new aspects, so far not recognised in the analysed papers. The analysis of the scientific literature shows that the research field on business incubation is marked by periodically upcoming new terms, where no uniform definition of the business incubation concept exists. Dee et al. (2011) give a good overview about the historic development of the business incubation research. As a distinct definition of the term business incubator is not existent, several search terms are included to achieve a profound comprehension about the overall research field.
A majority of scientists focused their research on measurable criteria of business incubators like the quality, the range and the amount of services offered by incubators, the duration and the characteristics of the incubation process or the satisfaction of the tenant firms with the incubators' performance (see, for example, Allen and McCluskey, 1990; Allen and Rahman, 1985; de Oliveira et al., 2011; Rice, 2002; Aerts et al., 2007; Fox, 2000; Singer, 2000; Abduh et al., 2007; Burnett and McMurray, 2008; McGinn, 2002; SCOR Report, 2000) . They therefore provide studies with highly descriptive character. Many researchers provide analyses about the performance or the performance and success measurements of business incubators (see, for example, Burger, 1999; Colao, 2012; Grimaldi and Grandi, 2005; McGinn, 2002; O'Neal, 2005; Rubens et al., 2011; Arlotto et al., 2011; Mandelker, 1996; Voisey et al., 2006) . Table 1 lists key dimensions, differentiation criteria, terminology and the relevant sources. Remarkably, the key dimensions show the lack of a framework foundation and the derived key dimensions do not differentiate between NPI and FPI. For the German incubator landscape, it can be noted that the term 'business incubator' was adapted from the USA and henceforth was used for the German term 'Gründerzentren' (Böhringer et al., 2005) . In the beginning, the term 'incubator' especially referred to for-profit oriented 'Gründerzentren', although nowadays the majority of incubators in Germany are sponsored by the government and therefore the two terms are used synonymously (Abetti, 2004) Plosila and Allen (1985) , Silva (2012), von Zedtwitz (2003) , Becker and Gassmann (2006) , Allen and McCluskey (1990) , Aernoudt (2004) , Fealey (2009), Todorovic and Moenter (2010) , Al-Mubaraki (2013) , Romero (2009 ), Brooks (1986 , Katz (2000) , Chandra et al. (2007) , Epure and Cuşu (2010) , Smilor (1987) , Hurley (2002) (2000), Mattare et al. (2012) , Somsuk et al. (2012) , Schwartz and Hornych (2012) , Chandra and Silva (2012) , Romero (2009) , Stevenson and Thomas (2001) , Al-Mubaraki (2012 ), Peters et al. (2004 , Sherman (1999) , Plosila and Allen (1985) , Moraru and Rusei (2012) Abduh et al. (2007) , Allen and Rahman (1985) , Al-Mubaraki and Busler (2012b) , Al-Mubaraki (2013), Autio and Klofsten (1998) , Fealey (2009), Mattare et al. (2012) , Aerts et al. (2007) , Fox (2000) , Singer (2000) , Peterson (2002) , Plosila and Allen (1985) , Lumpkin and Ireland (1988) (2000), Arlotto et al. (2011 ), Mandelker (1996 , Voisey et al. (2006) , Burger (1999) , Colao (2012) , Grimaldi and Grandi (2005) , O'Neal (2005) , Rubens et al. (2011 ), Böhringer et al. (2005 , McAdam and Marlow (2011), McKee (1991) , Bruno (2011 ), Minter (2010 , Moraru and Rusei (2012) , Peters et al. (2004) , Rovins (2006) and Schwartz (2011 Schwartz ( , 2012 All key dimensions show that the distinction between FPIs and NPIs is not always clear-cut since incubators are by nature flexible and multidimensional (Lewis et al., 2011) . Especially the stakeholder dimension as an indicator for FPI (privately owned) vs. NPI (public initiated and operated) cannot be confirmed from a literature point of view. There are profit-seeking, privately funded university business incubators (Arlotto et al., 2011) and hybrid corporate incubators that are simultaneously publicly and privately funded (Branstad, 2010) . Having this in mind, there is not a 'typical incubator', (Al-Mubaraki, 2013 ), but rather a vast amount of different incubator typologies. Classifications and terminologies are not complete and unchangeable since they are highly influenced by the dimensions of classification used and the subjective perspective of each author (Becker and Gassmann, 2006; Moraru and Rusei, 2012) .
Figure 2 Classification of business incubators
Source: Grimaldi and Grandi (2005) In addition to the distinction between NPIs and FPIs, there is an evolution in the nature of incubators caused by changes in economic, cultural, and other conditions. However, this perspective on classification was not found in the academic work analysed in this paper. Figure 2 shows a classification based on the model from Grimaldi and Grandi (2005) in which business incubators are placed in four categories: business innovation centres (BICs), university business incubators (UBIs), corporate private incubators (CPIs), and independent private incubators (IPIs). From the authors perspective there is a need for an additional segment above the IPI with own presumed attributes. This box in the upper-right corner represents the lowest public and the highest private stake. Grimaldi and Grandi (2005, p.113) define IPIs as "incubators set up by single individuals or by groups of individuals (companies too may be among their founding partners), who intend to help rising entrepreneurs to create and grow their business". The box 'CB' -for 'company builder' -on the upper-right overlapping with IPI, results from this slight but important difference in definition. While all other incubators -non-profit and for-profitselect existing ideas and teams, a company builder starts with generating ideas.
Methodology and data collection
Business incubation is a young research field with periodically upcoming terms; a qualitative and inductive approach was used for this study (Eisenhardt, 1989; Yin, 2003) . Empirical data was collected through a multi-method approach involving semi-structured interviews with experts and desk research (Kromrey, 2009; Glaser and Strauss, 1967; Yin, 2003) . Semi-structured interviews were particularly well-suited for this study since they allow detailed information to be gathered from external experts about subjective experiences, views, and personal assessments (Kromrey, 2009; Yin, 2003) . Desk research was used to adapt the interview guidelines by considering information such as size, age, and ownership structure from other interviews with the founders, the companies' websites, and newspaper articles. Companies were determined to be suitable for the study if they met the criteria of a 'for-profit business incubator' in accordance with the value adding intervention system (Figure 1 ), as well as the following requirements: 1 offered networking, subsidised rental space or collectively shared facilities, infrastructure, business and technical assistance, know-how transfer, and credibility 2 company ownership structure was corporate or private 3 for-profit orientation 4 start-ups in the (pre-)seed phase 5 located with main offices in Germany.
As one-third of all business incubators in Europe are located in Germany, this market was chosen (Al-Mubaraki and Busler, 2010) . Based on the results of the German market, the aim is to derive implications also for other European incubators. Because the differences between FPIs and other forms of incubators can be infinitesimally small, the selection criteria needed to be completely fulfilled. In contrast with angel investors, FPIs are not private persons, but rather represent companies, which might have a private or corporate structure and as such are organised with 'an identity, a set of routines, and a strategic core' (Phan et al., 2005) . They provide a wider range of services and support ventures in earlier stages than venture capitalists and angel investors. Whereas venture capitalists first and foremost provide funding for ventures close to market entry, incubators support start-ups that are in the pre-seed or seed phase and therefore can rather be regarded as complementary organisations in accelerating new ventures' developments (Achleitner and Engel, 2001; Carayannis and von Zedtwitz, 2005; Phan et al., 2005; Smilor, 1987) . About thirty companies that fulfilled the stated requirements were identified in popular and scientific literature (Ohrmann, 2011; Robinson, 2010) . Because selection was based on the incubators' characteristics (Rice, 2002) , companies were included regardless of their self-classification shown in column 3 of Table 2 .
Appropriate interview subjects were identified on the basis that they were either part of the underlying research problem (Meuser and Nagel, 2005) or had in-depth knowledge about the research topic (Gläser and Laudel, 2010) . Using this framework, an expert taking part in this study (listed from highest to lowest preference): a was the founder or part of the founding team of the incubator b was CEO or had a hierarchically comparable position within the company c had a position through which (s)he has access to all relevant information about the business model, main processes, and strategy of the incubator.
The selection process resulted in a database of the German FPIs as depicted in the Appendix, Table 9 . It served as the starting point for finding the most relevant interviewees independent of how frequently they appeared in the literature. All thirty companies were invited for the study. A defined time frame as well as the invitation response led to the eleven selected interviewees which are briefly described in Table 2 . This study follows a two-step approach to analysing and classifying the interviewees' companies and thereby identifying the main FPIs in Germany. First, there was a qualitative content analysis to evaluate the expert interviews; using the pre-formulated interview guidelines, four main categories and further subcategories were developed in a rule-governed and systematic way (Mayring, 2002) . The four main categories were the business model, the business incubation process, the company's strategy, and personal assessments:
• the business model category involved adapting the business model canvas theory of Osterwalder and Pigneur (2005) to categorise text passages into the respective detailed subcategories
• the business incubation process category included the subcategories: degree of standardisation, contractual agreement, idea creation/selection process, degree of involvement, and exit process (Gerlach and Brem, 2015) • the company strategy category included the subcategories: objectives, future development, motivation for founding, competition, and the corporate culture (in particular with regard to risk aversion)
• the category of personal assessments contained definitions and was analysed in terms of the subcategories: self-labelling, explanation of the terms 'business incubator', 'accelerator', and 'company builder', and conceptual overlaps.
This first step generated company-specific characteristics, similarities and differences between the interviewed companies, and several categories for classification.
In the second step, the empirical findings were aggregated on a higher level to develop an overall classification for all of the analysed companies. In this way, the companies were grouped according to their similarities and the prevalence of co-occurrence within the same (sub-)categories. This second step resulted in the identification of the current most-common FPIs in Germany and presented criteria for their differentiation.
Empirical findings
In this section, a structured overview of the interview findings is given, looking at each of the four main categories (the business model, the business incubation process, the company's strategy, and personal assessments). Table 3 Business model canvas translation
Osterwalder business model canvas Incubation characteristic
Value proposition • Amount of start-up funding
• Human resource processes and recruiting Customer segments
• Simultaneously supported start-ups
• Industry focus
• Developmental stages
• Founding team
• Born global
• Customer definition Channels
• Service delivery Customer relationships
• Push/Pull relationship Key resource/key partner
• Functional expert Key activities
• Founding activities
Business model
Considering the special profile of a business incubator in not selling products or services to customers but rather building companies, the basic business model framework canvas from Osterwalder and Pigneur (2005) needs to be translated into the incubation context.
• Value proposition: although all of the analysed companies met the study's requirements related to service provision, they differed considerably in their value proposition; especially true in terms of the funding amount and importance of services provided. In terms of the amount of start-up funding, the companies can be classified as small (<€250,000), medium (€250,000-€500,000), or large (>€500,000) incubators. On the upper end of the scale are companies I and J with a funding range from €500,000 to €4.0 million, whereby the ability to raise more than €500,000 can be considered to be exceptional. On the other side of the continuum, company K represented an exception within the small companies, with funding comprising only €25,000. Company G could not be classified, as it stated that there was no limit for the start-up funding. Beside the funding aspect, optimised human resources (HR) processes or recruiting services are key elements of the value proposition.
• Channels: a close proximity between incubator and incubatee is the determined aspect for support and control. Therefore, the majority of the companies see Bricks and Mortar (BaM) as compulsory, which is in line with the set of differentiation criteria against classic venture capital firms.
• Key resources/key partner: a majority of the companies had functional experts in their teams to cover central aspects, e.g., markets, operations, or technologies in the setup of a company. Depending on the criticality, the functional experts are either team members or in a very close partnership.
• Key activities: mainly refer to all tasks related to the companies' value proposition, and they are therefore comparable to the functions and activities of any other profit-seeking company to drive their success. A majority executes key resources for different incubation activities depending on their know-how, competencies, and experience. One main classification that could be made is on the one hand organisations that mainly created or founded their own companies and on the other hand those that primarily supported external companies. Four of the organisations that founded their own companies also pursued financial investments or angel investor activities as a secondary business.
• Customer segments: is a category with several analysed aspects. Beginning with the customer definition followed by the simultaneously supported start-ups (portfolio companies) and the industry focus. Maturity aspects are the start-ups' developmental stages, the character of the founding teams and the internationalisation.
• The customer relationship category refers to the duration, initial contact, and intensity of the relationship between the incubator and its start-ups. Interviewees showed substantial similarities in how they described this relationship. The terms 'pull' and 'push' describe the nature of these relationships -in a 'pull' relationship, the start-ups have to actively request services and support from the companies; in a 'push' relationship, the incubators oblige their start-ups to use the offered services to bring them into the right direction. 'Push' and 'pull' relationships also differed in terms of initial contact. In 'pull' relationships, start-ups actively applied to the companies; in 'push' relationships, companies had active recruitment strategies. Additionally, one can look at the intensity of the relationship -reflected in the frequency and duration of meetings -which were regular, close, very close, or even intertwined or melded to such an extent that the interviewees described it as a 24/7 relationship.
Incubation process
The incubation process for developing a start-up is more or less at the core of each interviewed company. Therefore, all aspects of process standardisation could be important for the success in terms of profitable exits in ratio to initiated companies and invested money. Analysed aspects are the degree of standardisation, the number of process steps and the way of standardisation of the incubation processes. A related aspect is the duration of active support to increase the probability of success.
Regarding initiation, some possessed a selection process, others an ideation process, or others both. 'Selection process' describes an approach in which external founder teams with business ideas are selected by the company; 'ideation process' refers to an internal idea-creation approach in which ideas are generated by the company's management team. Ideation is often marked by a structured, analytical process with market research and via databases and blogs, or through conversations with investors, students, or founders. Companies using a selection process chose start-ups based on a mix of the team, product, and market, based on their own competencies and the possibility to contribute to the start-ups' success or whether the applicants thematically fit the corporation.
After the initiation phase the degree of involvement as impact on operations is an important aspect. Especially in the beginning, the companies with high involvement were familiar with all day-to-day operations within the start-ups across all company functions; over time, the degree of involvement decreased and the companies transitioned to a strategic advisory role. Medium involvement refers to cases in which some operations were executed within the company while others remained the start-ups' responsibilities. Low involvement meant that no operational tasks -or only those explicitly required by the start-ups -were performed within the company.
The strategic decision-making process within the company largely depended on the shareholding structure. Companies with a minor stake in the start-ups gave more likely strategic guidance and recommendations while the final strategic decision stayed with the original founder. In light of development control more companies tend to have a major stake or co-founder functions in order to have the chance to influence the start-ups' strategic focus to a greater extent. Nevertheless, interviewees reported all strategic decisions were made in a democratic and fair way.
The 'exit process' -the time when the start-ups leave the company or vice versacould also be identified for all of the companies. The most common scenarios included:
• the complete sale of the start-ups to a strategic investor, competitor, or any other company
• a secondary sale of the shares with a multiple or positive return on investment
• a complete takeover of the start-up or an initial public offering. 
Strategy
General strategy comprises objectives such as: focusing on investor relations to secure timely future investments and potential exit partners; developing internal competencies across all company functions for sustainable economic activity; market focusing, strictly and narrowly on a few industries, niche markets, and geographic markets; constantly controlling certain key performance indicators; avoiding or enforcing internationalisation; pursuing a secrecy strategy; and avoiding certain exit strategies such as initial public offerings.
Regarding corporate culture in terms of risk profile: all companies had a certain risk profile either risk taking or risk averse.
All companies were aware of their influence on the start-ups' risk minimisation through their professionalism and infrastructure. Nevertheless, there were significant differences in the way they minimised their own risks of failing and thereby increased their success in general. Some companies primarily focused on proven business models or on a balanced portfolio in terms of the risk of business models. Others considered main factors to minimising the risk of failure as including their network, their own competencies and experiences, a flexible and lean employee structure, their collaboration with other incubators, their careful selection of teams, markets, and their general strategy. Concerning the careful selection of ideas, some companies preferred start-ups with a disruptive business model, while others pursued copycats and start-ups with less innovative business models, thereby emphasising the importance of good execution of the business idea.
Motivation for founding can be differentiated by economic, personal and content-related reasons. Economic reasons meant the companies were primarily founded due to profit-driven or monetary incentives. This rationale was present across all companies, but was the primary motivation for some. Personal reasons meant the companies were founded because of interest in or passion for entrepreneurship as experienced in past business activities. Content-related reasons refer to know-how, expertise, and experiences from the past through related business activities in the entrepreneurial sector or in the specific target markets of the companies. Furthermore, other motivation might exist if the start-up adds value through factors such as employer branding, open innovation, or access to external knowledge and innovation.
Future development is in a broader sense also a necessary field of risk mitigation. That explains why companies were asked about different activities in business development. Long-term vision, e.g., a shift from business-to-consumer to business-to-business projects was one of these, change or continuity of their industry focuses another. Possible areas for future development included the development of technologies, revenues and company growth, and internationalisation either of the start-ups or the incubator.
Looking at future value proposition, companies try to differentiate with provision of more financing, new forms of financing or more services.
A similar step is a backward integration of venture capitalist focused companies with a company building approach.
Competition and partnership: due to a flood of all forms of incubators and the fact that many venture capitalists enlarge their value proposition and become business incubators themselves, the competition among business incubators for venture capitalist financing is high. Like in many other industries, opposite position and mixed models were found.
Collaboration: in terms of a stronger collaboration with other incubators, some noted they would continue to exchange and use synergies or even increase the collaboration in the form of common projects; others said they would not further intensify the past collaborations. Table 6 Summary of strategy-related answers 
Personal assessment
Beside all objective criteria of the previous chapter, the open questions regarding the personal perspective in terms of self-definition and -labelling show the complexity of the current incubation landscape. As a result of the self-labelling, eight different terms were named explicitly. Two companies double-labelled themselves due to two synonymously used terms, and one company was indifferent between 'company builder' and 'classic incubator'. Companies H and I that labelled themselves as 'company builders' only recently began using this term instead of 'business incubator'.
For the self-definition, general descriptive as well as specific criteria (investment parameter, capital structure) were examined for business incubators, accelerators and company builders.
Business incubators were seen from the majority of the interview partner as companies that support external ideas through coaching, mentoring, and other services. As a result of this, founders that applied to business incubators normally came with existing ideas and as a complete team. One stated that the business incubator is, in contrast to a company builder, never totally part of the founding team. Contrastingly, three interviewees saw a business incubator as a company that builds up its own internal teams. The investment perspective can also be used to further differentiate incubator typologies: given answers have to be seen in contrast to accelerators and business incubators. Investment behaviour, time and duration are highlighted aspects. In terms of capital structure, some companies gave a hierarchy for the three incubator types based on the amount of equity, but some understood it exactly the other way round. Company I emphasised a recent change in its understanding of business incubators, insofar that the term now applies to mentoring programmes with minimal financing versus institutions more involved in operations with long investment phases.
In contrast to a business incubator, the mentioned distinct characteristics of an accelerator are: structured; school-like; with a mentoring program; having a time-limited support period and investing earlier into less developed start-ups. Only J understood accelerators as companies that invest into more developed start-ups at a later stage. The companies differed greatly in their understanding of how ideas are generated within accelerators: for some is the realisation of external ideas the vital element of accelerators, while some others regarded idea development as a task performed jointly by the founding team and an accelerator. The term 'investing' can either refer to the provision of funding or to support services and know-how without financial investment. The smaller funding sums of €20,000 to €30,000 and small equity shares are for some companies a way to differentiate accelerators from incubators. The active support or investment period varied as well: 8 to 16 weeks, while others just stated 'several weeks'.
Understanding of the term 'company builder' ranged from a provider of resources and money to a freely acting and organised company. While business incubators and accelerators were described with several characteristics, for the company builders two striking features -internal ideation and internal realisation -were mentioned. In relation to that, company builders were often understood as possessing more equity shares than the other two types of incubators. The mentioned characteristics for scope and time indicate a focussed company type. Nearly all interviewed companies connect with company builders, in contrast to accelerators, an always provided funding. Regarding future readiness, the traditional business incubation concept is seen as outdated, whereas the acceleration and company building models are fit for the future.
Table 7
Summary of personal assessment answers 
Category

Discussion and implications
This paper aims to identify the main FPI forms and the criteria with which they can be characterised and differentiated, based on the case of Germany. Therefore, is necessary to group the interviewed companies based on their similarities into categories, including sub-categories. The empirical analysis showed many similarities among the companies and therefore many possibilities for categorisation. However, it is impossible to classify companies into specific groups based on all of the differentiation criteria, as the companies differed greatly in their nature, characteristics, and business models. For example, classifying the companies based on company-specific criteria such as size, amount of funding, corporate culture in terms of risk affinity, or risk-minimisation strategies seems inappropriate because the companies were too diverse. Using the structure of equity shares and the number of simultaneously supported start-ups is also inappropriate, as they strongly depend on the companies' size and amount of funding. Furthermore, business assistance services are company-specific and the exit process was different for all of the companies while internationalisation seemed more likely if there were already international portfolio companies, and therefore these criteria cannot be traced back to specific group characteristics.
Instead, this study focuses on major similarities to identify related groups of incubators and looks more broadly at trends related to characteristics, similarities, and differences among the companies. Using this broader focus, three main FPI types can be identified as the currently most common in the German market: company builders, business incubators, and accelerators.
For all of the companies analysed in this study, the interviews confirmed the conceptual confusion apparent in relevant literature (Becker and Gassmann, 2006) ; the majority of the interviewees gave contradictory and differing explanations for the common names of FPIs (e.g., incubator, company builder, seed investor with added value).
Moreover, the fact that one of the interviewed companies revealed its inappropriateness to contribute to this study even though it was described as suitable in different newspapers and the company's website, confirms the thin line between German FPIs and other profit-driven investment forms, such as seed phase financing venture capitalists. Conceptual confusion is intensified through a growing presence of all forms of incubators, and the diversity of business models. Although there was competition among some of the companies, this diversity created conditions for partnership within the incubation market and led to cooperation among the companies. Whereas the literature explicitly mentions only access to investors as an important service of business incubators, all of the interviewed companies were providing initial funding for their start-ups as a core offering -albeit at different levels. It cannot be confirmed by the empirical results that company builders are the sole provider of funding. As the majority of the companies were supporting external teams (either as a primary or a secondary business activity), demo days were seen as important for all forms of FPIs to access prospective investors. The trend of German FPIs primarily supporting digital businesses is discussed in literature (Hüsing, 2013; Fuhrmans, 2012) ; this can also be confirmed empirically, as there are many specialised internet incubators in the German incubation industry. In spite of several similarities between the classic business incubators in theory and those in practice, one major difference lies in the last phase of the incubation process: none of the interviewees in the study used the term 'graduation process' to describe the last phase in which the start-ups leave the incubator; instead they talked about an 'exit process'. As FPIs have not received much attention in literature so far, this difference in terminology might be due to the fact that 'graduation' refers to NPIs to emphasise the protective and supportive character of such incubators. As a term that comes from the context of venture capitalists (Kollmann, 2009) , 'exit' seems appropriate for FPIs to underline these incubators' profit-seeking nature.
The empirical analysis shows that the dimensions and differentiation criteria for business incubators in literature could in some cases also be used to classify FPIs in Germany. The difficulty in identifying and grouping companies without overlap or contradiction shows their strong cohesiveness and confirms the fact that all of the analysed companies can be understood as FPIs. In comparison of the three types, some fundamental differences in the attributes slightly indicate a distinction between company builders on one side and incubator and accelerator on the other side. The fact that six of the eleven studied companies were company builders may indicate high and increasing importance of the company-building concept in the German FPI landscape, as also stated in literature (Knirsch, 2013) . This increasing importance is confirmed by the fact that three of the company builders recently changed or said they would change their self-labelling from business incubator to company builder, primarily to differentiate themselves from the other FPIs.
Finally, the results of this study have also implications for the parties covered in the triple helix model and their collaboration across Europe. As Germany is one of the biggest markets for business incubators (Al-Mubaraki and Busler, 2010) , other countries in this landscape might also profit from the idea of FPI. In addition to the traditional public business incubator models, constructs like 'company builders' and 'accelerators' should be taken into consideration at the public policy level in all European countries.
So far the study shows that the motivation for internationalisation is low, both for the incubators and for their start-ups. There should be a mutual motivation between European Union organisations and the industry to increase, strengthen and professionalise entrepreneurial activities. In this context, scalability is an important aspect for all start-ups but especially for FPIs due to the fact of their investment portfolio with numerous companies and the related capital commitment in combination with their investment horizon. European leaders should take decisive steps to make country borders meaningless for entrepreneurial organisations. The full single market -28 countries, 507 million people, and €12 trillion of annual gross domestic product -should be as accessible for every start up as currently only their home-country market is (Salido et al., 2013) .
As mentioned in the context of the triple helix model, the level of collaboration between industry and universities is limited and can be increased. There is an ambiguous picture for company builders and incubators as well as accelerators. But improved entrepreneurial education is a general benefit especially for incubators and accelerators because both are looking for external ideas and teams. This is especially true for Europe with a unique endowment that could be used more effectively. Hence, a central request to the local municipalities as well as to the European institutions is to support closing the loop between the different actors: a pan-European program could incentivise stronger collaboration and connections between university hubs, research institutes, business schools and FPIs. Such an initiative aiming to boost for-profit accelerators and incubators should consider allocating around 50% of funds to support programmes promoted by these types of institutions.
Moreover, the current economic and financial situation in Europe offers further opportunities. On the one hand, public budgets for entrepreneurial activities are decreasing, and on the other hand, extremely low interest rates on savings lead to higher willingness to take on risks for investments. Less for company builders and incubators, but more for accelerators as the study showed might offer interesting constructs even for small investors as a kind of crowdfunding (Tomczak and Brem, 2013) . This can be an attractive model in countries where the ticket size of funding is even lower and the access to venture capital is even more difficult (Salido et al., 2013) . A similar concept could be to raise capital in countries where the saving alternatives are limited and invest it in countries where the funding sector is weak. Such an approach is realised in the start-up 'weltsparen.de'.
This again refers to the well-established triple-helix idea and to its extensions to a quadruple or a quintuple helix, which will be briefly discussed in the following. All forms of incubators are a melting pot of business venture interests in an organisational framework, but in different forms. Their role in knowledge-based economies can be explained by the triple helix model showing relationships among governments, universities, and industry (Etzkowitz and Leydesdorff, 2000) . Business incubators can be considered knowledge products of innovative systems (Carayannis and Campbell, 2012) . Figure 3 shows the generic triple helix model with balanced dimensions. This generic form fits quite well with the BICs and UBIs shown in Figure 2 ; all involved parties have the same importance. However, moving into the upper-right of Figure 2 toward CPIs and IPIs, this evenly balanced model becomes less applicable. The proportionately greater overlap between industry and government is depicted in Figure 4 , showing an adjusted Triple Helix model more appropriate to company builders, CPIs, and IPIs. In case of CPIs and IPIs the government plays an important role for the attractiveness from a taxing, regulatory and governmental support point of view, e.g., investment subsidies or the often discussed German anti-angel-law. Required resources and recruiting aspects result in a limited overlap between industry and university (Lendner, 2004; Mian, 1996) . Short investment periods in combination with high expected and needed return on investment generates the need for experienced people. A profound education in entrepreneurial matters is in this case more or less the prevailed common interest.
It is important to note that this type of situation arises not from an active withdrawal of universities and governments, but rather from a call to action on the part of industry (namely by the successful founder).
Additionally -in cases of company builders, CPIs and IPIs -many authors have used extensions of the model: a quadruple or a quintuple helix. These extensions are especially helpful in explaining company builders, firms that are exclusively privately organised, as well as CPIs and IPIs. The quadruple helix plays an important role in explaining the rise of FPIs, with digitisation as an explaining factor. Two reasons for that are: first, of course the social change due to the important part of digitisation in all our lives; second the related opportunity in this new industry from a market size view in combination with the comparable easy market entry from a technology perspective. Another trend in the context of society is the non-organic growth of established companies by acquiring grown start-ups. This kind of business developments with the strong number of worth-million-exits can be pulled up as an indicator for the increased need or attractiveness of company builders. With constructs such as company builders, industry can be strategically matched with technological developments from universities, and beyond that, with public bodies and private stakeholders.
Limitations and directions for future research
Conducting qualitative research leads to non-generalisable results, as they involve the interviewees' perceptions. Objectivity, reliability, and validity could have been improved if multiple researchers had analysed the interviews (Helfferich, 2005) . Despite keeping the companies' identities anonymous, this study still may suffer from social desirability bias as the experts might have chosen to depict their company in a favourable light. Additionally, many of the analysed companies were too young to provide sufficient information, especially about future developments and past problems. As eleven out of approximately thirty relevant FPIs in Germany were interviewed, this study generates valuable insights into the German FPI market; however, a larger data sample could have contributed to a higher consistency and the elimination of contradictory empirical results as outliers among the expert statements could have been identified as such. Additionally, some of the differentiation criteria used in this study might only reflect individual characteristics of the interviewed companies and may not be suitable to make general statements about the different types of incubators. As the category 'value proposition' mainly provides information about the amount and range of services, a more specific and explicit analysis of the content and substance of the provided services might be useful to further classify German FPIs.
This study solely presents trends within each group of business incubators, and it is important to note that classification was dependent on the author's understanding and interpretation and that there were exceptions and variations within each group. For example, although all companies in the 'accelerators' group were part of a corporation that simultaneously ran an incubation program, there certainly are companies that exclusively focus on acceleration programmes. Additionally, the realisation of internally generated business ideas, the rather narrow industry focus, or the realisation of 'copycats' might have been identical across a majority of the company builders; nevertheless, some companies within this group emphasised external and very innovative ideas and focused on general or wide industries. Some companies within the 'business incubators' group focused on mid-to long-term planning and mentioned personal reasons for the foundation of the company.
Because expert interviews were used in this study, neutrality and objectivity might in general be reduced. To counteract subjective assessments and misunderstandings, the interviews were all conducted with a semi-standardised interview guideline and preferably face to face. Even though the interview guideline helped to maintain neutrality to a certain extent, the interviewer adopted the interviewees' terms (e.g., 'exit process') and therefore might have contributed to a differentiation upon such criterion. As the interviews were mainly analysed on the basis of their actual content -without identifying pauses, voices, and para-linguistic elements (Meuser and Nagel, 2005 ) -future research might consider an interpretation of used words to further derive implications about the different business incubation concepts. Additionally, as the majority of the companies required from the interviewers and authors to be kept anonymously, some crucial trends within each group were neglected, such as the amount of funding in relation to the company's size to meet this promised commitment.
In spite of these limitations, this paper generates valuable insights and contributes to a better understanding of the main German FPI concepts. It not only identifies three main FPI concepts, but also presents several criteria upon which they can be classified. The results of this study can also be aggregated to a higher and more general level to globally compare FPIs and NPIs. This study found that the company building approach was the most common FPI concept in Germany. Contemporarily, there is no consensus among the experts regarding the question which form of business incubator is most sustainable in the future.
Future research therefore might take this paper as a basis to analyse the future development of the three identified FPI types and might primarily focus on analysing the reasons for the development of the company building approach. Furthermore, an analysis of the company builders' success factors in Germany and globally, as well as further analysis of their start-ups, might provide additional insights. For instance, regions like the Silicon Valley might be seen as special cases for entrepreneurial activities with important implications for setting up successful incubators (Berger and Brem, 2016) . As the market fluctuates and rapidly changes, it is difficult to acquire a large sample of comparable results from experts over a long period of time. Conducting research on a regular basis is therefore necessary to derive valid and reliable results about FPIs in Germany.
Finally, research on university business collaboration might profit from taking the development into consideration that also in this field an evolutionary process is ongoing with continuous development of new incubator types (anymore). The developments in the last 30 years led to many different kinds of incubators with very different motivations, from benefits for the regional development without any profit interest, to profit oriented, to start-up 'boilers'.
